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Introduction
A substantial amount of research has been devoted to the analysis of price competition between firms. However, relatively little research has attempted to explain why firms would commit to a fixed price. In this paper, firms can choose any feasible transactions mechanism, specifying the net trades of each customer in each state of nature. Price competition emerges endogenously, because all equilibria involve all active firms choosing a transactions mechanism equivalent to price fixing with rationing.
The environment can be sketched as follows. There are two goods, an indivisible "commodity" and a perfectly divisible "numeraire." The set of consumers who arrive at the market is random. Conditional on arriving, all consumers are identical, with a utility function that is concave over numeraire consumption. Each risk-neutral firm must produce output (or, given an alternative interpretation, install capacity) before the realization of random demand. At the same time a firm chooses its output, it must also commit to a transactions mechanism. That is, a firm must specify a function that maps each subset of consumers and the order of their arrival into a vector of net trades. The only restrictions placed on the space of mechanisms is that they be anonymous and that they be ex-post individually rational for consumers (no one pays more than his/her valuation and no one is required to pay unless he/she consumes the commodity). Then each consumer at the market, knowing the outputs and transactions mechanisms of all firms, must choose a firm.
After setting up the model in Section 2 and proving some preliminary results about the consumer subgame in Section 3, the main results are proven in Section 4. Theorem 1 states that any equilibrium involves all active firms choosing to fix prices. Theorem 2 states that any equilibrium of the price-competition game (where firms are required to fix prices) is an equilibrium of the larger game (where firms can choose any feasible transactions mechanism).
Thus, we can focus on the simpler price-competition game, since it has the same set of equilibria as the larger game.
Of course, the fact that all arriving consumers are of the same "type" simplifies the space of transactions mechanisms. In particular, consumers do not send messages to the mechanism. In
McAfee [1993] , the aggregate number of buyers is known, but their valuations are heterogeneous and random. Firms are assumed to have one unit to sell, and they compete by offering any transactions mechanism. In equilibrium, firms choose to run the same, efficient auction.
McAfee 's [1993] setting is quite complicated, and he requires sellers to ignore the impact of their actions on the expected payoffs that buyers receive from other sellers. In Peters [1994] , firms take into account their effect on the expected payoffs buyers receive from other sellers, but this effect disappears in the limit, as the number of sellers approaches infinity. Peters [1994] also allows sellers as well as buyers to be heterogeneous. By focusing on the symmetric buyer case, we can incorporate production decisions and uncertainty about the number of arriving buyers. At the same time, there is no implicit or explicit assumption about a large number of firms.
The Model
There are two types of agents, consumers and firm-owning entrepreneurs. There are two physical commodities: a numeraire commodity, y, and a commodity produced by firms, x.
Consumers demand either zero or one unit of commodity x. The total number of potential consumers, indexed by i and j, is J. However, the number of active consumers will generally be less than J. The number of firms, indexed by f and h, is F.
Firms are risk neutral, seeking to maximize expected profits. That is, firm f is an entrepreneur that cares only about numeraire consumption, y . Commodity x is produced from f an input Y according to the production function x = g (Y ), where g is assumed to be strictly f f f f f monotonic, concave, and continuously differentiable for f = 1, ... , F. It follows that we can invert g to find the firm's cost function, c (x ) = g (x ), which must be strictly increasing and convex. states, µ, and the mixed strategy chosen by active consumers, , a probability measure over is uniquely determined. To conserve notation (while slightly abusing it), we denote both the unconditional and conditional probabilities of events related to as ( ) or ( ).
An "arrival event" contains all aggregate demand states in which we observe a particular number of active consumers at the market. Denote the arrival event by e, where we have e = 1, ... , E. The unconditional probability of arrival event e, by definition, is µ(s). Let the s e number of active consumers in arrival event e be given by n(e). Define the maximum possible number of active consumers by n = max n(e). Finally, let the number of consumers visiting max e firm f under be denoted #C .
f f A firm's transactions mechanism specifies the allocation of goods x and y received by each of its customers, as a function of the firm's arrival vector. Here, a consumer's allocation is characterized by whether or not the consumer purchases good x, and if so, the price paid. In Definition (2.1) below, we use the convention that non-customers receive an allocation of zero.
Our results are completely unaffected if we allow firms to choose mechanisms that 1 randomize over allocations. This is because firms are allowed to condition the allocation on the arrival order of customers, which serves as the randomizing device. Indeed, if we allowed firms to choose mechanisms that randomize, we could drop all mention of arrival orders. The present specification is used to avoid further complicating the notation. The game in which firms may choose any feasible transactions mechanism, , is defined as follows. Firms simultaneously choose their output, x , and a transactions mechanism, t T, f f Naturally, the mixed strategy, , can depend on the subgame. If a particular subgame 2 has several equilibrium mixed strategies that can be Pareto ranked for consumers, we assume that one yielding the highest utility to consumers is selected. However, we show below that subgames of the price-competition game always have a unique equilibrium . 
The Consumer Subgame
Before considering the equilibrium behavior of firms, we will need some preliminary results about the consumer subgames of and . In this section, we take the transactions p mechanisms chosen by firms as given. The first part of the proof of Lemma (3.1) shows that W (f) will be independent of j j whenever all consumers are choosing the same strategy, , irregardless of whether is an equilibrium. Therefore, the following definition is well-defined.
Definition 3.3: Given (feasible) transactions mechanisms of firms and the mixed strategy
chosen by all consumers, denote the expected utility of consumers offered by firm f as ( ).
From Lemma (3.1), is a symmetric Nash equilibrium to the consumer subgame if and only if there is a W such that, for f = 0,1, ... F At the fixed-point ( , W), define Z by
13 From (3.7), we have for all firms f,
Consider the firm, h, for whom > 0 and ( ) = W. We know from (3.8) that there is such a h h h firm. Looking at equation (3.9) for firm h, it follows that Z = 1. Therefore, (3.9) simplifies to (3.10) = 0 and
The equations and inequalities of (3.10) imply (3.4) and (3.5), so the fixed point is a symmetric Nash equilibrium of the consumer subgame.
Typically, firm f's profits are strictly increasing in and the utility offered by firm f, f ( ) , is strictly decreasing in . The intuition is that higher means more customers, which Condition (3.11) guarantees that there is some chance a consumer visiting firm f is rationed, and that consumers visiting firm f strictly prefer not to be rationed.
Lemma 3.12: If all firms are choosing transactions mechanisms t T satisfying (3.11), then
f p the resulting consumer subgame has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium .
Proof: Lemma (3.6) guarantees that there is at least one symmetric Nash equilibrium. To show that it is unique, suppose that there are two equilibria, and . Without loss of generality, let > > 0 and 0 < < hold for two firms, f h. Since and are strictly f f h h f h decreasing, we have ( ) < ( ) and ( ) > ( ). However, Lemma (3.1) implies that
In order to prove our main results, we must ensure that a price-fixing firm will choose a price and quantity satisfying (3.11). Essentially, the highest possible demand must be too unlikely or too costly for one firm to serve. The following condition on costs is sufficient.
For a proof of this claim, see Peck [1993, Proposition 4.7] . 4 15 Condition (3.13) is by no means necessary, since the likelihood of some consumers choosing other firms will dissuade firm f from producing n units of output. 
The Main Theorems
In this section, we provide two results about the emergence of price competition.
Theorem 1 shows that for any SNE of , all participating firms choose a transactions mechanism equivalent to price-fixing with rationing. Theorem 2 shows that any SNE of is also a SNE of p . Thus, the two games have the same set of SNE.
The notation used in this section treats the mixed strategy chosen by consumers and consumers' utility as functions of the transactions mechanisms chosen by firms. Proof: Suppose there is a SNE of and some firm f choosing a mixed strategy that assigns positive probability to a transactions mechanism, t , for which output is positive and we have f t T T . Given the transactions mechanisms chosen by the other firms, given , and given f f p the utility W, firm f can increase consumer utility without affecting expected profits by smoothing the numeraire consumption of consumers receiving the good, i.e., by charging a fixed price. By raising the price appropriately, firm f can increase profits and maintain consumer utility at W, in 4 follows that (t , t-) ( , t-) holds. Firm f's profits would have been strictly higher f f f f f f under than under t if consumers had maintained the same mixed strategy, (t , t-), by (4.3)
Theorem 1: If condition (3.13) is satisfied, then for any SNE of , we have t T for all
in the construction of . Consumers are at least as likely to choose firm f under than under t , f f f so it follows that firm f's profits under are at least as high as they would have been if f consumers had maintained their old mixed strategy; this is because the likelihood of unsold goods is lower. Therefore, the deviation to results in strictly higher profits for firm f whenever tf f puts us in Case 2.
Recapitulating, we see that Case 1 is impossible and that Case 2 leads to higher profits.
Therefore, the deviation to results in strictly higher profits for firm f, no matter what f transactions mechanisms are chosen by the other firms. This contradicts the supposition that t is f played with positive probability in a SNE.
Theorem 1 demonstrates that the competition of all feasible transactions mechanisms will lead to the emergence of price competition with rationing. The obvious implication is that price competition is worthy of study. Several papers have studied models in which firms must fix prices and produce or install capacity in advance of demand uncertainty, followed by the arrival of consumers who must commit to a firm. See, for example, Carlton [1978] or Deneckere and Peck [1995] . Theorem 2 demonstrates that any equilibrium of is also an equilibrium of . (z , ... , z , ... , z ) are the firms' mixed because there may be multiple equilibria to the consumer subgame resulting from a deviation.
Remark 4.5:
It is important to allow for equilibria in which firms choose mixed strategies in Theorems 1 and 2, because pure-strategy equilibrium often fails to exist. The nonexistence of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium under Bertrand competition with certain demand is well known.
For a game similar to , Deneckere and Peck [1995] show that whenever there is demand p uncertainty and a sufficient number of firms, there exists a Nash equilibrium in which all firms choose pure strategies. However, if demand does not fluctuate much and the number of firms is small, then firms must use mixed strategies in any Nash equilibrium.
Allowing Consumers to Visit Several Firms
In this section, we explore the degree to which the model could be generalized to allow consumers to visit several firms instead of just one. If Theorems 1 and 2 were to remain valid, the set of environments in which price competition could be expected to arise endogenously would be expanded. The first issue to confront is a modelling issue: without additional structure on the model, a transactions mechanism is ill-defined. Some consumers might decide to opt out of a firm's mechanism, and other consumers who initially visited another firm might want to opt in.
We must specify the process by which each consumer receives commitments from firms, makes commitments to firms, and eventually becomes a single firm's customer.
We focus attention here to the case in which customers who do not purchase can visit other firms. That is, we have the following timing: (1) firms simultaneously choose output and functions mapping arrival vectors to feasible net trades, (2) consumers commit to visit a firm and abide by the mechanism if allowed to purchase, (3) each firm chooses a second-round function mapping its arrival vector to net trades, where feasibility is with respect to remaining output, (4) previously unmatched consumers commit to visit a (possibly different) firm and abide by its second-round transactions mechanism if allowed to purchase, and so on until there is a round with no transactions made.
The added complication is that the utility of unmatched consumers is not fixed, but depends on the continuation payoff of entering the next round. Now the utility of consumers visiting firm f, ( ), implicitly depends on firm f's current transactions mechanism and the f f continuation payoff, which depends on the equilibrium of the ensuing subgame. Not only does f affect the outcome of the current mechanism, but could also affect the continuation payoff for given firm f's fixed price mechanism, allows us to prove Theorems 1 and 2. For the multipleround game considered in this section, while ( ) may typically be strictly decreasing, no f f condition along the lines of (3.11) is readily available, for the following reasons. First, there is no easy guarantee that consumers strictly prefer to purchase. The utility of not purchasing now depends on the endogenous continuation game, rather than simply the reservation utility level.
Second, consumers choosing firm f in round 2 could know that they will not be rationed, in which case higher would not affect the utility offered by firm f. This will occur if the number of f consumers is small but many of them happened to choose the same firm in round 1. Third, it is possible for higher to increase the continuation payoff, for example by shifting consumers f across firms in a way that reduces the market power of firms with output remaining. If this effect is strong enough, ( ) could be increasing.
f f
Concluding Remarks
Our results strongly depend on the assumption that consumers are identical, conditional on arriving at the market. Allowing heterogeneous preferences would create a tradeoff in which fixing prices benefits consumers by eliminating price risk but also hurts some consumers by introducing allocative inefficiencies. It would be a difficult and entirely new project to solve the game in which firms can select a transactions mechanism with the allocation being a function of the preference-type reported by customers. Gilbert and Klemperer [1993] look at a model in which a monopolistic firm must balance the incentive to induce ex ante investment by consumers and the incentive to efficiently allocate output ex post. In their model, consumers are heterogeneous, and it is shown that the optimal mechanism might involve price fixing and If output is not observable, the firm might want to underproduce. However, there is no 8 incentive to withhold output from customers.
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rationing. Allowing competition between firms in Gilbert and Klemperer [1993] would greatly complicate the situation.
The risk aversion of consumers leads to their desire to have numeraire consumption smoothed over states of nature, which leads to the result that all SNE involve all firms choosing to fix prices. However, even if the purchases are small relative to incomes, so that risk neutrality is the more reasonable assumption, there will always be some SNE in which all firms choose to fix prices. Price competition remains an equilibrium transactions mechanism. Also, Theorem 2
shows that our analysis of the game in which price competition is assumed is free from the criticism that the equilibrium would disappear when other transactions mechanisms are allowed.
Since price fixing is simple, it would not be hard to introduce costs of implementation to the model and conclude that price fixing uniquely emerges, even under risk neutrality. Price fixing has some other desirable features not captured in the present analysis. When consumers must transact immediately, before all consumers arrive at the firm, price fixing with first-come-firstserved rationing is easy to implement; other transactions mechanisms, like market clearing, require the firm's entire arrival vector to be known before any transactions are finalized, which might not be feasible in practice. Second, there is the issue of commitment to a transactions mechanism.
Any attempt to charge a customer more than the announced, fixed price is immediately apparent to the customer and might be legally verifiable; clearly, the firm does not benefit from selling at a lower price or withholding the output for customers yet to arrive. Other transactions 8 mechanisms, like market clearing, might allow the firm to mask a departure from the announced
In a "Bud-lite" commercial, a bartender pretends that only one beer is left, forcing the 9 two customers to bid for it. Even if everyone knows there are two beers left, the bar could employ a "shill" to create the appearance of excess demand.
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transactions mechanism. For example, the firm could claim that demand was high, necessitating a high price.
